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Abstract
Self-disgust is a distinct self-conscious emotion schema that is characterized by disgust appraisals directed towards the 
self. Recent studies have demonstrated the negative efects of self-disgust on physical and mental health, but little is known 
about the psychological characteristics that are associated with self-disgust experiences. The present study assessed the 
direct and indirect efects of impulsivity, self-regulation, and emotion regulation on self-disgust. Overall, 294 participants 
(M age = 21.84 years, SD = 4.56) completed structured and anonymous measures of trait impulsivity, self-regulation, emo-
tion regulation strategies, and self-disgust. Path analysis showed that non-planning impulsivity and expressive suppression 
(positively) and cognitive reappraisal and self-regulation (negatively) predicted self-disgust. Intervening variable analysis 
showed that attentional and non-planning impulsivity had signiicant indirect efects on self-disgust via emotional regulation 
strategies and self-regulation. Our indings provide, for the irst time, evidence about the association between self-disgust and 
individual diferences in impulsivity, self-regulation, and emotion regulation, and have implications for the psychological 
phenomena that may lead to self-disgust experiences in non-clinical populations.
Keywords Self-disgust · Self-conscious emotions · Self-regulation · Emotion regulation · Impulsivity
Disgust is a universal emotion that serves survival in humans 
by alerting the body to potential contamination and exposure 
to biological pathogens (Rozin et al. 2000). In this respect, 
disgust has been primarily associated with food and body 
products (Rozin and Fallon 1987), and other stimuli that 
serve as primes for disease and pathogen exposure (Curtis 
and Biran 2001; Curtis et al. 2004). The disease and patho-
gen avoidance model of disgust posits that the core mecha-
nism of disgust has been developed to bias behaviour against 
primes of disease, and through social development, this 
mechanism triggers disgust towards moral and social norm 
violations (Oaten et al. 2009). Similarly, Curtis and Biran 
(2001) argued that the emotion of disgust has biologically 
developed as an aversion to physical parasites, and socio-
culturally developed as aversion to social parasites. Support-
ing evidence has also shown that disgust sensitivity is dif-
ferentiated across domains pertaining to pathogen exposure, 
sexuality and moral violations (Tybur et al. 2009). Simpson 
et al. (2006) demonstrated that disease-related and socio-
moral disgust stimuli had some unique distinctive proper-
ties (e.g., temporal duration). In support of this view, recent 
evidence from cognitive neuroscience showed that a single 
neural region (the insula) may serve the three domains of 
disgust sensitivity (Vicario et al. 2017), and that core and 
moral disgust stimuli provoke similar facial motor activity 
(Chapman et al. 2009).
While disgust is meant to serve an adaptive function to the 
biological and the socio-moral self, abnormal levels of dis-
gust reactivity to a range of elicitors (e.g., measured by higher 
scores in proneness to disgust in self-reported surveys) has 
been associated with mental health problems, such as anxiety, 
mood, and eating disorders (e.g., Fox 2009; Ille et al. 2014; 
Olatunji et al. 2010), and may represent a risk factor for sui-
cidal ideation (e.g., among people with eating disorders; Chu 
et al. 2015). Power and Dalgleish (2008) argued that a special 
form of disgust directed to the self (i.e., self-focused disgust 
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or, simply, self-disgust) is more relevant to certain psycho-
pathologies, and that self-disgust can explain the association 
between dysfunctional thought patterns, such as rumina-
tion and negative evaluations of the self and the world, and 
resulting depressive mood. Indeed, in his original, inluential 
writings on depression, Beck (1967) argued that self-critical 
and maladaptive self-focused cognitions elicited negative 
self-directed feelings, which eventually resulted in depressive 
states. The role of afect was critical in this process, and was 
conceptualised by Beck as explicitly involving disgust: “the 
feeling of self-dislike is stronger and may progress to a feeling 
of disgust with himself” (Beck 1967, p. 18).
In support of this argument, Overton et al. (2008) devel-
oped a self-report measure of self-disgust (the Self-Disgust 
Scale [SDS]) and showed that self-disgust mediated the 
association between dysfunctional thoughts and depressive 
symptoms, a inding that was supported by subsequent stud-
ies (albeit with more complex structures; e.g., Powell et al. 
2013; Simpson et al. 2010). In their conceptualization and 
measurement of self-disgust, Overton et al. (2008) identi-
ied two dimensions of self-disgust: the “disgusting self”, 
which relects disgust towards the self (e.g., “I ind myself 
repulsive”), and “disgusting ways”, which represents dis-
gust towards one’s own actions and behaviour (e.g., “the 
way I behave makes me despise myself”). The two-dimen-
sional structure of self-disgust and the conceptual distinc-
tion between self/personal and behavioural disgust were 
validated in another study that used an alternative measure 
of self-disgust (i.e., the Questionnaire for the Assessment 
of Self-Disgust [QASD]; Schienle et al. 2015). Although 
there are alternative explanations about the development 
and adaptation of the basic disgust emotion towards physi-
cal and “social” parasites (Curtis and Biran 2001), much 
less is known about the psychological antecedents of self-
disgust—in other words, how and why people become to 
feel disgusted with aspects of their self. Partly, this may be 
attributed to the relatively more recent development of self-
disgust research, and to the focus of this research on the 
efects of self-disgust on mental health and well-being (e.g., 
Azlan et al. 2017; Brake et al. 2017; Overton et al. 2008). 
Exploring the psychological origins of self-disgust, how-
ever, presents a compelling and equally important domain 
of research inquiry (Powell et al. 2015). In this paper, we 
particularly focus on the role of self-regulatory failure and 
impulsivity as potential explanatory variables of the self-
disgust experience.
Self‑disgust as an emotion schema
Qualitative research into the subjective experience of self-
disgust showed that social comparison processes and the 
internalization of other people’s reactions and criticisms 
were frequently mentioned as contributing factors to the 
genesis of self-disgust (Powell et al. 2014). These indings 
suggest that self-disgust requires some sort of self-awareness 
and a symbolic representation of the self, a feature that is 
not necessary for the experience of basic emotions (e.g., 
fear, anger, surprise, disgust), but plays an important role in 
the experience of more complex, self-conscious emotions, 
such as pride, shame, guilt and embarrassment (Power and 
Dalgleish 2008; Tracy and Robins 2004). In particular, a 
main distinctive feature of self-conscious emotions is that 
they entail self-evaluation, self-relection, and self-repre-
sentation. People are aware of and relect on their actions 
and evaluate them against socio-cultural and moral norms 
and standards, and accordingly experience a variety of self-
conscious emotions (Leary 2004; Tracy and Robins 2007). 
Evidence has also shown that compared to other animals, 
social species that are capable of experiencing self-aware-
ness (e.g., primates) are also capable of displaying emotional 
reactions that are similar to self-conscious emotions, such as 
pride, shame, and embarrassment (Tracy and Robins 2004; 
Weisfeld and Dillon 2012). Because self-conscious emotions 
require self-referential appraisals as well as an appreciation 
of other people’s emotions and thoughts, they are said to 
emerge later in development as compared to basic emotions 
that are experienced from childbirth (Izard 2007; Muris and 
Meesters 2014).
Cognitive complexity is another distinctive feature of 
self-conscious emotions. While basic emotions can involve 
more complex cognitive processes, they do not necessitate 
them in the same way as self-conscious emotions do (e.g., 
de Hooge et al. 2010; Tracy and Robins 2007). Self-con-
scious emotions (e.g., shame, guilt, pride) typically involve 
more complex cognitive perquisites and processing than 
basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear), including a need for self-
awareness; an awareness of others’ appraisals; an under-
standing of social standards, norms and rules; the causal 
attribution of actions and goals to social actors, including 
things like intent; and an understanding of the surrounding 
situational and contextual factors during the emotion elicit-
ing experience (de Hooge et al. 2010). The same degree 
of cognitive complexity is present in the conceptualization 
of self-disgust as a psychological phenomenon that entails 
“an enduring (or repetitive) disgust reaction elicited by par-
ticular aspect(s) of the self, which are deemed signiicant 
to an individual’s sense of self, and appraised as relatively 
constant and/or not easily changeable” (Powell et al. 2015, 
p 0.5). Given the shared features between self-disgust and 
other self-conscious emotions, some researchers have argued 
that self-disgust represents a distinct self-conscious emotion 
(Roberts and Goldenberg 2007), or that it represents a spe-
cial form of shame (Power and Dalgeish 2008). Powell et al. 
(2015) provided an encompassing deinition of self-disgust 
as an emotion schema (see also Izard 2007), or an enduring 
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cognitive-afective orientation towards the self, involving an 
afective component similar to the emotional experience of 
disgust, with relevant cognitive and higher-order appraisals 
(e.g., “my body is revolting”). In their deinition, Powell 
et al. (2015) emphasized the self-referential dimensions of 
self-disgust, as well as the dynamic interaction between the 
emotional experiences of (self-directed) disgust, associ-
ated self-referential cognitive content, such as thoughts and 
beliefs about one’s actions and physical body, and related 
behaviours (e.g., avoidance and rejection).
While self-disgust is thought to be often concomitant 
with other negative self-directed afective phenomena, such 
as shame (Powell et al. 2014), Powell et al. (2015) argue for 
unique, identifying properties, such as the phenomenological 
state of revulsion, a discrete expressive proile (e.g., facial 
expression), links with contamination and the laws of con-
tagion and similarity, and speciic appraisals (e.g., “yuck, 
that is repulsive”). Shame, on the other hand, is largely 
concerned with hierarchical submission and evaluations of 
reduced social rank (Gilbert 2007). A small body of research 
has also conirmed independent predictive validity for self-
disgust over and above other self-conscious emotions such 
as shame (e.g., Olatunji et al. 2015; Penley and Tomaka 
2002). While there is scope for more research to empirically 
support the diferentiation between self-disgust and other 
self-conscious emotions it is equally important to identify 
the experiences and psychological processes that may lead 
people to experience self-disgust (Powell et al. 2015). In this 
paper, we strongly emphasize the cognitive self-referential 
aspect of self-disgust and we argue that self-disgust partly 
stems from people’s capacity (or the lack thereof) to resist 
impulses and exercise regulation of their thoughts, actions, 
and emotions.
Self‑disgust as self‑regulatory failure
Self-regulation is deined as people’s capacity to focus on 
their long-term goals and resist temptation and impulses for 
immediate gratiication (Carver and Scheier 2016). As such, 
self-regulation involves the ability to alter thoughts, actions, 
and emotions in a way that serves goal striving, whether the 
goal is set by the self, the society or both. Self-regulation 
has gained considerable research and media attention over 
the last 15 years, and some researchers have even proclaimed 
it as humanity’s greatest strength, and as the key to success 
in life (Baumeister et al. 2002). Indeed, a large body of evi-
dence has shown that higher self-regulation is associated 
with better academic and work performance, good interper-
sonal relationships, better mental health outcomes, emo-
tional well-being, and life satisfaction (Hofmann et al. 2014; 
Tangney et al. 2004). Accordingly, self-regulation failure has 
been associated with a whole host of adverse psychological 
and behavioural outcomes, such as substance use, impulsive 
purchase behaviour and overspending, school underachieve-
ment, relationship problems, violence, sexual risk-taking, 
and long-term unemployment (Baumeister 2003; Carey et al. 
2004; Daly et al. 2015; DeWall et al. 2007; Rafaelli and 
Crockett 2003; Tangney et al. 2004; Vohs and Faber 2007).
Succumbing to impulses is perhaps one of the most obvi-
ous expressions of self-regulatory failure (DeYoung and 
Rueter 2016), and behavioural impulsivity has been recog-
nized as one of the key components of inadequate self-reg-
ulation (Baumeister and Heatherton 1996; Baumeister et al. 
2007). According to Carver et al. (2009), trait impulsivity 
involves the presence of an urge or desire, and the inabil-
ity to self-regulate, inhibit, and control that impulse. Trait 
impulsivity has been associated with psychopathology (e.g., 
Granö et al. 2007; Peluso et al. 2007; Whitesire and; Lynam 
2001), and studies on children with ADHD have indicated 
a positive association between childhood impulsivity and 
later development of depression (Brodsky et  al. 2001). 
Trait impulsivity has also been positively associated with a 
range of adverse behavioural outcomes, such as unhealthy 
eating and overeating (e.g., Jasinska et al. 2012), sexual 
risk-taking (e.g., Kahn et al. 2002), as well as substance-
related and behavioural addictions (e.g., Lee et al. 2012; 
Verdejo-García et al. 2008). According to Barratt’s three-
factor model impulsivity relects three main characteristics: 
greater motor activation (motor impulsivity), such as acting 
at the spur of the moment; less attention to the task at hand 
(attention impulsivity); and a reduced ability to plan actions 
(non-planning impulsivity; Patton et al. 1995; Stanford et al. 
2009). Empirical support for this model has come from stud-
ies using self-reported measures, such as Barratt’s Impul-
siveness Scale (BIS; Patton et al. 1995), as well as studies 
showing a positive correlation between the BIS and objec-
tive neuropsychological and laboratory behavioural meas-
ures of impulsivity, event-related potentials (e.g., reduced 
P300 amplitude) and fMRI studies (Asahi et al. 2004; Ding 
et al. 2014; Moeller et al. 2001; Russo et al. 2008; Spinella 
2007).
Importantly, self-regulation and impulsivity have 
been diferentially associated with the experience of self-
conscious emotions. In particular, Tangney et al. (2004) 
reported a signiicant positive correlation between higher 
self-regulation scores and guilt, and a signiicant negative 
association between higher self-regulation and shame, even 
after controlling for the efects of social desirability. Another 
study showed that self-regulation failure in an exercise con-
text (i.e., missing an exercise session) was associated with 
the experience of shame and guilt (Streuber et al. 2015). 
In a similar vein, Sheikh and Janof-Bulman (2010) found 
that inadequate self-regulation (e.g., failing to restrain exces-
sive eating, gambling, and overspending) were signiicantly 
associated with shame. Carver et al. (2010) reported that 
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authentic pride (e.g., feelings of accomplishment and coni-
dence) was positively associated with self-control, whereas 
hubristic pride (e.g., feelings of arrogance) was associated 
with impulsivity. Finally, an experimental study on con-
sumer behaviour showed that participants with higher trait 
impulsivity succumbed to more impulsive purchase behav-
iours than consumers with lower impulsivity scores, and this 
self-indulgence was associated with experiencing negative 
purchase-related self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and 
regret (Ramanathan and Williams 2007; Experiment 1).
Taken together, these indings highlight the role of self-
regulatory capacity (or the lack thereof) in the experience 
of self-conscious emotions in a simple but profound way. 
When people succumb to impulsive behaviour and fail to 
regulate their actions according to ideal self-representations 
or standards, they are likely to experience shame, guilt, and 
hubristic pride, whereas adequate self-regulation is associ-
ated with authentic pride (Carver et al. 2010). Possibly, these 
associations can be attributed to the self-representational 
and cognitive complexity of self-conscious emotions: people 
relect on how well they can regulate their behaviour, evalu-
ate their behaviour against personal or societal expectations 
and standards, and accordingly experience self-conscious 
emotions. Self-disgust is also characterized by self-repre-
sentation and cognitive complexity (e.g., Powell et al. 2015), 
and this makes it theoretically plausible to anticipate an 
association between self-regulation, trait impulsivity, and 
self-disgust. People may experience more self-disgust from 
succumbing to impulsive behaviour and failing to self-reg-
ulate, and less self-disgust when adequate self-regulation is 
exercised and impulsive behaviour is restrained. Neverthe-
less, no study has addressed this question thus far.
Emotion regulation and self‑disgust
Emotion regulation represents a group of automatic or con-
trolled processes by which people try to modify their emo-
tions in order to achieve a desired goal (Aldao et al. 2010; 
Gross 2013; Webb et al. 2012), and this goal may entail 
increasing (up-regulation) or decreasing (down-regulation) 
the magnitude or the duration of emotional responses (Gross 
2013). According to the process model of emotion regula-
tion (Gross and Thompson 2007) people can regulate their 
emotions before (antecedent-focused emotion regulation) 
or after (response-focused emotion regulation) the emo-
tional response, and diferent emotion regulation strategies 
have diferent consequences (Gross 2013). Cognitive reap-
praisal and expressive suppression represent two distinct and 
widely studied emotion regulation strategies. The former is 
an antecedent-focused strategy and involves the cognitive 
re-interpretation of events or situations in order to alter the 
emotional response or reduce its impact before it occurs, 
whereas the latter represents a response-focused strategy 
that aims to modulate emotional responses after they have 
occurred by inhibiting expressive behaviour (e.g., modulat-
ing anger by suppressing it; Gross 2013, 2015).
Both cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression 
are commonly used to down-regulate emotions but they 
have diferential consequences on various levels of human 
functioning. At a cognitive level, expressive suppression is 
associated with poorer memory for the situation that elic-
ited the emotional response, whereas cognitive reappraisal 
has been associated with improved memory and exam per-
formance (Sheppes and Gross 2011). Similarly, cognitive 
reappraisal, but not expressive suppression, attenuated the 
efect of negative emotions (e.g., disgust, fear) on decision-
making (Heilman et al. 2010). At a social level, suppression 
has been associated with less liking from interacting part-
ners, whereas cognitive reappraisal does not seem to have an 
adverse impact on interpersonal relationships (Butler et al. 
2003; Gross and John 2003). At an afective level, cognitive 
reappraisal is associated with decreased negative emotional 
experiences and the increase of positive ones, but expres-
sive suppression decreases positive emotional experiences 
and leaves negative ones unchanged (Gross and John 2003; 
Gross and Thompson 2007). Similarly, a cross-cultural study 
showed that cognitive reappraisal was associated positively 
with life satisfaction and trait positive afect, and negatively 
with depressed mood and trait negative afect, and the oppo-
site pattern of associations was observed for expressive sup-
pression (Haga et al. 2009). Finally, expressive suppression 
has been positively associated with higher scores in mental 
health symptoms, such as anxiety, PTSD, and depression 
(Moore et al. 2008).
Despite the abundance of studies on the efects of cog-
nitive reappraisal and expressive suppression on various 
aspects of human functioning, there is limited evidence 
about the efects of those emotion regulation strategies on 
the experience of self-conscious emotions, such as self-
disgust. This is an important omission for the following 
reasons. First, the conceptualization of self-disgust as a 
self-conscious emotion schema involves a lasting appraisal 
of the self (or its actions) as disgusting and repulsive, and 
this appraisal may be activated by speciic beliefs, situations 
or events (Powell et al. 2015). As an antecedent-focused 
strategy, cognitive reappraisal may counteract the efects 
of relevant eliciting events, thoughts, or situations before 
self-disgust is experienced, and accordingly lead to lower 
levels of self-disgust. Support for this argument comes from 
studies that have demonstrated how appraisals (e.g., causal 
attributions) can inluence the experience of self-conscious 
emotions, such as shame and guilt (Tracy and Robins 2006). 
Furthermore, as a response-modulation strategy, expressive 
suppression will require a great deal of resources to modu-
late self-disgust once it is experienced (Sheppes and Gross 
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2011), and studies have shown that suppression is an inef-
fective strategy in undoing the efects of negative emotional 
states (Gross and John 2003; Gross and Thompson 2007). 
Therefore, if cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppres-
sion have diferential efects on the emotional experience 
(Gross 2015; Gross and Thompson 2007), then it is theoreti-
cally plausible that they would be diferentially associated 
with self-disgust, with cognitive appraisal negatively associ-
ated and expressive suppression positively associated with 
self-directed disgust responses. However, this assumption 
has not been empirically examined as yet.
The present study
Over the last decade a growing body of research has exam-
ined the association between self-disgust and physical and 
mental health outcomes in various domains (e.g., Azlan 
et al. 2017; Brake et al. 2017; Ille et al. 2014; Overton et al. 
2008). Nevertheless, the psychological characteristics and 
processes that may give rise to self-disgust experiences have 
not been empirically investigated as yet. The focus of this 
paper is on the psychological characteristics that may lead 
people to experience self-disgust, and more speciically, on 
the roles of self-regulation, emotion regulation and impul-
sivity in this process. The existing evidence supports the 
contention that self-disgust represents a self-conscious 
emotion schema that incorporates some of the key features 
of other self-conscious emotions (i.e., cognitive complex-
ity and symbolic self-representation); emerges from the 
complex interaction between perception, emotion, apprais-
als, and cognition; and can be triggered or “elicited” by a 
relection on psychological or physical characteristics of 
the self (Powell et al. 2015). With this conceptualization in 
mind, we propose a model of self-disgust that particularly 
addresses the roles of impaired self-regulation, maladaptive 
emotion regulation, and high impulsivity as key psychologi-
cal characteristics that may elicit self-disgust experiences. 
It is important to note that, within the context of the present 
study, the elicitation of self-disgust is not discussed as a 
stimulus–response process, such as the automatic activa-
tion of revulsion and disgust following exposure to disgust-
related stimuli (e.g., faeces). Rather, following from Powell 
et al. (2015) we refer to the elicitation of self-disgust as the 
cognitive, afective and physiological response to lasting fea-
tures of the self. This conceptualization is consistent with 
Izard’s (2007, 2009) contention that emotion schemas, such 
as self-disgust, can be activated by certain environmental 
triggers (i.e., external stimuli), as well as “internal” stimuli, 
such as thoughts, memories and self-appraisals.
Our model is based on two contentions. First, the sym-
bolic self-representation and cognitive complexity aspects 
of self-disgust allow people to relect on their actions, 
judge their actions against their self-ideals (or ideals 
posed by the society or referent others), and accordingly 
experience self-disgust. According to Powell et al. (2015), 
self-disgust involves a lasting appraisal of the self as dis-
gusting, and the proxy factors that can elicit self-disgust 
experiences may involve individual characteristics and 
traits or other important aspects of the self (e.g., “the way 
I act makes me feel sick”). Relatedly, self-appraisals of 
one’s own behaviour and actions is an important aspect of 
self-disgust, and this is relected in the way self-disgust 
has been operationalized and measured in relevant quan-
titative studies (e.g., “the way I behave makes me despise 
myself”, “I feel good about the ways I behave”, and “my 
behaviour repels other people”; Overton et  al. 2008). 
Poor self-regulation and higher impulsivity appear to be 
the cornerstones of a wide range of problem behaviours 
(Baumeister et al. 2002; Tangney et al. 2004), and should 
provide the factual basis for negative self-evaluations of 
one’s own actions. Therefore, it is theoretically plausible 
that people should experience lower levels of self-disgust 
if they lived up to their ideal self-standards by exhibiting 
adequate self-regulation and restraining impulsive behav-
iour, and higher levels of self-disgust if they failed to self-
regulate and succumbed to impulsiveness.
Secondly, emotion regulation strategies can diferentially 
inluence the experience of self-disgust. People who adopt 
adaptive emotion-regulation strategies, such as cognitive 
reappraisal, are allowed to re-construe and reinterpret the 
outcomes of their actions and, accordingly, the experience of 
self-disgust will be attenuated. In contrast, the use of mala-
daptive emotion regulation strategies, such as expressive 
suppression, is focused on inhibiting the emotional response 
that ensued from impaired self-regulation and is insuicient 
to modulate the negative experience of self-disgust. Finally, 
the ability to regulate one’s emotions has been associated 
with reaching behavioural goals, whereas the lack of such 
ability is often associated with self-regulatory failure and the 
expression of impulsive behaviours (Roberton et al. 2012). 
Also, models of self-regulation posit that higher (vs. lower) 
self-regulation act protectively against impulsive urges on 
behavioural outcomes (e.g., Baumeister and Heatherton 
1996; Baumeister et al. 2007), and research has shown that 
the adverse efects of impulsivity on behavioural and men-
tal health outcomes can be mediated by emotion regulation 
strategies and self-regulation (e.g., d’Acremont and Van der 
Linden 2007; Liau et al. 2015). It is sensible to argue that 
emotion and self-regulation could also play an intervening 
role and explain the association between impulsivity and 
self-disgust. Based on these contentions, the following 
hypotheses were formed:
H1 Higher self-regulation and lower trait impulsivity will 
be associated with lower levels of self-disgust.
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H2 Adaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., cogni-
tive reappraisal) will be associated with lower levels of 
self-disgust.
H3 Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (i.e., expres-
sive suppression) will be associated with higher levels of 
self-disgust.
H4 The ability to regulate thoughts, emotions, and behav-
iour (i.e., emotion regulation and self-regulation) will indi-
rectly account for (intervene in) the association between 
impulsivity and self-disgust.
Methods
Participants
Overall, 450 individuals were approached face to face by 
a trained research assistant. Four hundred and thirty-one 
participants agreed to take part in the study and, of them, 
294 cases were completed and eligible for analysis in the 
present study (inal response rate = 65.3%). Only complete 
cases were used in analyses due to the ethical right to with-
draw from the survey at any time. Missing data analysis 
showed that non-completers did not difer signiicantly from 
the 294 cases, and that the missing cases could be classi-
ied as MCAR (Little’s test p > .05). Participants were aged 
between 17 and 51 years (M = 21.84, SD = 4.56), 60.5% were 
females, and 89.5% had a British background, and included 
undergraduate and postgraduate students from three univer-
sities in South Yorkshire, England. The research was carried 
out in accordance with the Code of Human Research Ethics 
of the British Psychological Society, and participants were 
provided with consent forms to complete, and were duly 
informed about their participation rights (i.e., voluntary and 
anonymous participation; no penalties for withdrawing from 
the study at any stage without previous notice).
Measures
Demographics
Demographic characteristics were assessed with open-ended 
questions asking participants to indicate their age (i.e., how 
old are you?), gender, and nationality.
Impulsivity
Impulsivity was assessed with the Abbreviated Impul-
siveness Scale (ABIS; Coutlee et al. 2014). The ABIS is 
an 11-item measure of trait impulsivity, that is, people’s 
tendency to act spontaneously and “on impulse” without 
thinking or reasoning about their actions. It consists of 
three sub-scales that relect attentional (e.g., “I don’t pay 
attention”), motor (e.g., “I say things without thinking”), 
and non-planning (e.g., “I am future oriented” reverse 
scored item) impulsivity. Calculating a total “impulsiv-
ity” score is not recommended psychometrically (Coutlee 
et al. 2014). Responses are coded on a 4-point Likert scale 
(1 = rarely/never, 4 = almost always/always). Following 
reverse scoring of 8 items, a mean score is computed for 
each subscale and higher scores indicate higher impulsive-
ness. The reliability and validity of the ABIS has been 
reported by Coutlee et al. (2014). In the present study, the 
internal consistency reliability coeicients (Cronbach’s α) 
for each ABIS subscale was acceptable (ABIS non-planning 
α = 0.74; ABIS motor α = 0.75; ABIS attention α = 0.67).
Emotion regulation
Emotion regulation was measured with the Emotion Regula-
tion Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John 2013). The ERQ 
is a 10-item measure that assesses individual diferences in 
emotion regulation strategies. It consists of two sub-scales 
that relect expressive suppression (e.g., “I control my emo-
tions by not expressing them”) and cognitive reappraisal 
(e.g., “When I want to feel positive emotion (such as joy or 
amusement), I change what I’m thinking about”). Responses 
are given on 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree). A mean score is computed for each scale 
and higher scores indicate higher emotion regulation. The 
reliability and validity of the ERQ have been reported in 
previous studies (Gross and John 2003). In the present study 
the internal consistency reliability for the ERQ sub-scales 
was high (cognitive reappraisal α = 0.81; expressive suppres-
sion α = 0.72).
Self-regulation
Self-regulation was measured with the 31-item Short Self-
Regulation Questionnaire (SSRQ; Carey et al. 2004). The 
SSRQ is the shorter version of the Self-Regulation Ques-
tionnaire (SRQ; Brown et al. 1999) and relects diferent 
aspects of people’s self-regulatory capacity, such as goal-
setting and monitoring (e.g., “I set goals for myself and keep 
track of my progress”), self-control (e.g., “I am able to resist 
temptation”), and deliberate thinking/reasoning of actions 
(e.g., “I usually think before I act”). Responses are given 
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). A sum score is generated and higher scores relect 
greater self-regulatory capacity. The reliability and validity 
of the SSRQ has been reported previously (e.g., Carey et al. 
2004) and in the present study the internal consistency reli-
ability coeicient was high (α = 0.92).
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Self-disgust
Self-disgust was assessed with the Self-Disgust Scale (SDS; 
Overton et al. 2008), an 18-item measure relecting disgust 
and repulsiveness directed to the self. Six items are iller 
items (e.g., “I enjoy the company of others”) and 12 items 
relect self-disgust towards the self (e.g., “I ind myself repul-
sive”), and towards one’s behaviour/actions (e.g., “I often do 
things I ind revolting”). Responses are coded on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree), and 
after reverse scoring 9 items a total sum score is computed. 
Higher scores indicate higher levels of self-disgust. Self-
disgust is relected in the total sum score, as well as in the 
sub-scales of “disgusting self” (or physical self-disgust) 
and “disgusting ways” (or behavioural self-disgust), and the 
reliability and validity of this measure has been reported 
elsewhere (Overton et al. 2008). In the present study, the 
internal consistency reliability was acceptable for the total 
self-disgust scale (α = 0.88), and the subscales of behav-
ioural (α = 0.76) and physical self-disgust (α = 0.79).
Design/procedure
A cross-sectional, correlational, survey-based design was 
used to measure the associations between demographic char-
acteristics (age, gender, and nationality), impulsivity, emo-
tion regulation, self-regulation, and self-disgust. As part of 
a larger study, participants were approached and recruited in 
University premises and were asked to complete an online 
survey (hosted on Qualtrics, http://www.qualt rics.com). 
Only participants who completed all study measures were 
included in this study, all other data were discarded. No time 
restrictions were applied and survey completion required 
approximately 15 min.
Data analysis
As some of the study variables were not normally-distrib-
uted (and regular linear regression methods resulted in non-
normally-distributed residuals), Spearman’s rho correlations 
were used to explore initial associations in the data, followed 
by a bootstrapped path analysis of the hypothesised rela-
tionships between the constructs. Path analysis has many 
advantages over standard regression techniques, including 
the ability to estimate direct and indirect efects (through 
multiple intervening variables), and multiple dependent vari-
ables, simultaneously, allowing the researcher to account for 
the interdependence in the outcome variables (by correlat-
ing their error terms). As recommended (e.g., Hayes 2009; 
Hayes and Scharkow 2013), we used bias-corrected and 
accelerated bootstrapping (10,000 resamples; Mallinckrodt 
et al. 2006) to obtain conidence intervals (and associated 
probability values) for all direct and indirect efects in the 
path model. Bootstrapping is a robust alternative to standard 
parametric estimates, when the assumptions around the lat-
ter may be violated (Fox 2008). All data were analysed in 
SPSS v. 22 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NT, USA), and AMOS v. 
24 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NT, USA).
Results
The descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among 
the study variables are presented in Table 1. In this sam-
ple, women reported signiicantly higher levels of physical 
self-disgust than men, rrb = 0.25, p < .001. Cognitive reap-
praisal was negatively associated with physical, rs = − 0.19, 
p < .01, and behavioural, rs = − 0.19, p < .01, self-disgust. 
On the other hand, expressive suppression was positively 
associated with physical, rs = 0.15, p < .01, and behavioural, 
rs = 0.24, p < .001, self-disgust. The attention subscale of 
the ABIS was positively associated with physical, rs = 0.14, 
p < .05, and behavioural, rs = 0.14, p < .05, self-disgust. The 
motor subscale had a marginally signiicant relationship with 
physical self-disgust, rs = 0.10, p < .10, and a signiicant 
positive relationship with behavioural self-disgust, rs = 0.13, 
p < .05. The non-planning subscale had a marginally signii-
cant negative relationship with physical self-disgust only, 
rs = − 0.10, p < .10. Finally, self-regulation was signiicantly 
negatively related to both physical, rs = − 0.32, p < .001, and 
behavioural, rs = − 0.41, p < .001, self-disgust.
Direct efects of impulsivity, emotion regulation 
and self‑regulation on self‑disgust
The results of the path analysis are presented in Table 2. 
When conditioned on all other variables, the non-planning 
impulsivity subscale had a negative and signiicant direct 
efect on physical, β = − 0.27, p < .001, and behavioural, 
β = − 0.20, p < .01, self-disgust. Cognitive reappraisal 
significantly negatively predicted physical self-disgust, 
β = − 0.12, p < .05, and had a marginally signiicant efect 
on behavioural self-disgust, β = − 0.09, p = .093. Expres-
sive suppression signiicantly positively predicted physical, 
β = 0.17, p < .01, and behavioural, β = 0.20, p < .001, self-
disgust. Finally, self-regulation was signiicantly and nega-
tively associated with both physical, β = − 0.25, p < .001, and 
behavioural, β = − 0.42, p < .001, self-disgust.
Indirect efects of impulsivity on self‑disgust
The results of our hypothesised indirect path analyses are 
presented at the bottom of Table 2. In combination, the 
three regulation variables (i.e., self-regulation, emotion 
regulation/cognitive reappraisal, and emotion regulation/
expressive suppression) had a signiicant intervening efect 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of study variables
N = 294. Correlations represent Spearman’s rho (rs), rank-biseral (rrb), or phi (rΦ) coeicients. ABIS Abbreviated Impulsiveness Scale, SDS Self-Disgust Scale. 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p < .001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Age –
2. Gender − 0.15* –
3. Nationality − 0.31*** 0.06 –
4. Cognitive reappraisal 0.13* −0.06 −0.11† –
5. Expressive suppression − 0.04 − 0.19** 0.05 − 0.09 –
6. ABIS attention − 0.14* 0.16** 0.08 − 0.13* − 0.08 –
7. ABIS motor − 0.12* 0.00 0.15* − 0.05 − 0.07 0.45*** –
8. ABIS non-planning − 0.00 − 0.08 − 0.10 − 0.20** − 0.02 0.58*** 0.35*** –
9. SDS self − 0.05 0.25*** 0.02 − 0.19** 0.15** 0.14* 0.10† − 0.10† –
10. SDS ways − 0.03 0.03 − 0.08 − 0.19** 0.24*** 0.14* 0.13* 0.01 0.64*** –
11. Self-regulation 0.12* − 0.19** − 0.07 0.24*** − 0.14* − 0.58*** − 0.36*** − 0.38*** − 0.32*** − 0.41*** –
Range 17–51 0–1 0–1 6–42 4–28 5–18 4–16 4–16 5–35 5–34 50–145
M 21.84 0.61 0.89 27.64 14.87 11.15 9.70 8.25 14.97 14.73 107.26
SD 4.56 0.49 0.31 6.35 4.97 2.62 2.57 2.61 6.73 6.28 16.49
Median 21 1 1 28 15 11 9 8 14 13.50 108
IQR 2 1 0 8 8 3 3 4 9 9 22
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Table 2  Direct and indirect 
efects in the hypothesised path 
model
N = 294. SDS Self-Disgust Scale. Estimates conditioned on age, gender, and nationality. Probability values 
determined on bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapped CIs (10,000 bootstrap resamples)
Model pathways β BCa 95% CI β p
Lower Upper
Direct path estimates
Attention ĺ reappraisal − 0.06 − 0.22 0.11 0.466
Attention ĺ suppression − 0.03 − 0.18 0.13 0.736
Attention ĺ self-regulation − 0.48 − 0.60 − 0.36 0.000
Attention ĺ SDS self 0.07 − 0.09 0.23 0.418
Attention ĺ SDS ways − 0.07 − 0.23 0.10 0.418
Motor ĺ reappraisal 0.09 − 0.03 0.22 0.142
Motor ĺ suppression − 0.10 − 0.22 0.03 0.145
Motor ĺ self-regulation − 0.10 − 0.22 0.02 0.093
Motor ĺ SDS self 0.08 − 0.05 0.22 0.222
Motor ĺ SDS ways 0.09 − 0.04 0.21 0.193
Non-planning ĺ reappraisal − 0.20 − 0.36 − 0.04 0.018
Non-planning ĺ suppression 0.01 − 0.14 0.16 0.894
Non-planning ĺ self-regulation − 0.10 − 0.22 0.02 0.102
Non-planning ĺ SDS self − 0.27 − 0.40 − 0.13 0.000
Non-planning ĺ SDS ways − 0.20 − 0.33 − 0.06 0.004
Reappraisal ĺ SDS self − 0.12 − 0.22 − 0.02 0.017
Reappraisal ĺ SDS ways − 0.09 − 0.18 0.02 0.093
Suppression ĺ SDS self 0.17 0.06 0.27 0.003
Suppression ĺ SDS ways 0.20 0.09 0.31 0.000
Self-regulation ĺ SDS self − 0.25 − 0.39 − 0.11 0.000
Self-regulation ĺ SDS ways − 0.42 − 0.57 − 0.28 0.000
Indirect path estimates
Attention ĺ reappraisal ĺ SDS self 0.01 − 0.01 0.04 0.326
Attention ĺ suppression ĺ SDS self − 0.01 − 0.04 0.02 0.669
Attention ĺ self-regulation ĺ SDS self 0.12 0.05 0.20 0.000
Attention ĺ ALL ĺ SDS self 0.12 0.04 0.21 0.002
Attention ĺ reappraisal ĺ SDS ways 0.01 − 0.01 0.03 0.296
Attention ĺ suppression ĺ SDS ways − 0.01 − 0.04 0.03 0.690
Attention ĺ self-regulation ĺ SDS ways 0.20 0.13 0.30 0.000
Attention ĺ ALL ĺ SDS ways 0.20 0.12 0.31 0.000
Motor ĺ reappraisal ĺ SDS self − 0.01 − 0.04 0.00 0.091
Motor ĺ suppression ĺ SDS self − 0.02 − 0.05 0.00 0.097
Motor ĺ self-regulation ĺ SDS self 0.03 − 0.00 0.06 0.055
Motor ĺ ALL ĺ SDS self − 0.00 − 0.05 0.05 0.921
Motor ĺ reappraisal ĺ SDS ways − 0.01 − 0.03 0.00 0.117
Motor ĺ suppression ĺ SDS ways − 0.02 − 0.06 0.00 0.107
Motor ĺ self-regulation ĺ SDS ways 0.04 − 0.01 0.10 0.077
Motor ĺ ALL ĺ SDS ways 0.02 − 0.05 0.08 0.619
Non-planning ĺ reappraisal ĺ SDS self 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.017
Non-planning ĺ suppression ĺ SDS self 0.00 − 0.02 0.03 0.842
Non-planning ĺ self-regulation ĺ SDS self 0.03 − 0.00 0.07 0.068
Non-planning ĺ ALL ĺ SDS self 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.050
Non-planning ĺ reappraisal ĺ SDS ways 0.02 − 0.00 0.05 0.056
Non-planning ĺ suppression ĺ SDS ways 0.00 − 0.03 0.04 0.862
Non-planning ĺ self-regulation ĺ SDS ways 0.04 − 0.01 0.10 0.085
Non-planning ĺ ALL ĺ SDS ways 0.06 − 0.01 0.14 0.077
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between attentional impulsivity and physical, β = 0.12, 
p < .01, and behavioural, β = 0.20, p < .001, self-disgust. This 
multivariate efect was driven strongly by the self-regulation 
scale, which was the only signiicant univariate intervening 
variable in this relationship (see Table 2). There was also a 
marginally signiicant indirect efect of the self-regulation 
scale and the emotion regulation subscales between non-
planning impulsivity and physical self-disgust, β = 0.05, 
p = .050. This efect was driven again by the self-regulation 
variable (see Table 2), but also cognitive reappraisal, which 
was a signiicant intervening variable in the relationship 
between non-planning impulsivity and physical self-disgust, 
β = 0.02, p < .05 (see Fig. 1).
Discussion
Self-disgust is a self-conscious emotion schema that shares 
common features with other self-conscious emotions, such 
as shame and guilt, but has a unique expressive and phenom-
enological proile (Powell et al. 2015). Although research 
interest on the association between self-disgust and psycho-
pathology has signiicantly increased over the last 7 years 
(e.g., Brake et al. 2017; Ille et al. 2014; Overton et al. 2008), 
there is a paucity of research on the psychological phenom-
ena and processes that may elicit self-disgust responses 
(Powell et al. 2014, 2015). The present study assessed the 
association between self-regulation, emotion regulation, trait 
impulsivity, and self-disgust, and examined diferent hypoth-
eses with respect to these associations.
First, we hypothesized that, because self-disgust involves 
symbolic self-representation and cognitive complexity (Pow-
ell et al. 2014, 2015), people evaluate their behaviour against 
their self (or social) ideals and experience lower self-disgust 
when their ideals are met through efective self-regulation 
and inhibition of impulsive behaviour; accordingly, higher 
self-disgust is more likely to occur when self-regulation fails 
and higher impulsivity is exhibited. Second, based on the 
emotion regulation literature (d’Acremont and Van der Lin-
den 2007; Gross and John 2003; Gross and Thompson 2007; 
Haga et al. 2009), we anticipated that expressive suppression 
(positively) and cognitive reappraisal (negatively) would 
Fig. 1  Path model explaining the efect of impulsivity in three 
domains (attention, motor, and non-planning) on self-disgust via 
individual diferences in three types of regulatory mechanisms (cog-
nitive reappraisal, expressive suppression, and self-regulation). Self-
regulation signiicantly moderated the efect of attention impulsivity 
on physical (SDS self), β = 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.20], p < .001, and 
behavioural (SDS ways), β = 0.20, 95% CI [0.13, 0.30], p < .001, self-
disgust. Non-planning impulsivity had a signiicant indirect efect 
on physical self-disgust via cognitive reappraisal, β = 0.02, 95% CI 
[0.00, 0.07], p = .017 (see Table 2 for full results). Control variables 
and error terms are omitted for clarity. Estimates were conditioned 
on participants’ gender, age, and nationality. Error terms for the three 
intervening variables were correlated, as were the error terms for the 
two outcome variables. All estimates are standardised. Statistical sig-
niicance was determined based on bias-corrected and accelerated 
bootstrapped CIs (10,000 resamples). †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p < .001
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predict self-disgust. Our indings supported these hypotheses 
and showed, for the irst time, that the two facets of self-dis-
gust that were measured in the present study (i.e., disgusting 
self/physical self-disgust and disgusting ways/behavioural 
self-disgust) were diferentially associated with self-regu-
latory variables and trait impulsivity both in terms of sta-
tistical signiicance and efect size. More speciically, the 
disgusting self subscale was negatively associated with cog-
nitive reappraisal and self-regulation, and positively associ-
ated with expressive suppression and attentional impulsiv-
ity. The disgusting ways subscale was negatively associated 
with cognitive reappraisal and self-regulation, and posi-
tively associated with expressive suppression, attentional, 
and motor impulsivity. Although the efect sizes between 
self-disgust and the trait impulsivity and emotion regulation 
subscales were small according to Cohen (1992), the efect 
sizes between the self-disgust subscales and self-regulation 
were moderate. This indicates that self-regulation is more 
strongly associated with the experience of self-disgust, as 
compared to emotion regulation strategies and impulsivity. 
These indings were further corroborated by path analysis 
which showed that self-regulation was more strongly and 
directly associated with both dimensions of self-disgust, as 
compared to the efects of emotion regulation strategies and 
impulsivity dimensions. Our inal hypothesis was that self-
regulation and emotion regulation would act as interven-
ing variables in the efects of impulsivity on the experience 
of self-disgust. The results from the path analysis partially 
supported this hypothesis by showing signiicant indirect 
efects of attentional impulsivity on physical and behavioural 
self-disgust, and signiicant indirect efects of non-planning 
impulsivity on physical (but not behavioural self-disgust), 
via self-regulation and emotion regulation strategies.
Taken together, the present study has important theoret-
ical implications. Firstly, although most research on self-
disgust suggests that behavioural outcomes (e.g., being 
overweight) are associated with experiencing self-disgust, 
our indings show that self-disgust may be also related to 
the psychological characteristics (i.e., self-regulation and 
impulsivity) that are associated with and have been found 
to lead to such undesirable and disgust-eliciting behav-
ioural outcomes (e.g., Tangney et al. 2004). Secondly, and 
relatedly, impulsivity dimensions, and more speciically 
attentional and non-planning impulsivity, seem to play 
a role in the experience of self-disgust. The tendency to 
behave in an automatic and non-planned manner is asso-
ciated with higher self-disgust, and this association is 
partly explained by self-regulation, and to lesser extent 
by emotion regulation strategies. This lends support to our 
argument that people may experience self-disgust when 
they fail to resist impulses and exhibit poor regulation of 
their thoughts, actions, and emotions. Our cross-sectional 
design and the use of self-reports, however, do not rule 
out the possibility of reverse causality and response bias 
(e.g., socially desirable responding or self-deception; Paul-
hus 2002). Future studies should examine if behavioural 
measures of impulsivity (e.g., disinhibition/attentional 
tasks; Moeller et al. 2001) are related to self-disgust, and 
whether such an association is explained indirectly by 
self-regulation. Furthermore, our study provided indings 
about the association between self-disgust and individual 
diferences in self-regulatory capacity without focusing 
on speciic behavioural outcomes. It is possible that the 
observed associations may be stronger in the context of 
more speciic problem behaviours (e.g., dysfunctional 
drinking, sexual misconduct, problem gambling) that 
have been associated with poor self-regulation and higher 
impulsivity, and this is something that further research 
may look into.
Second, a wide range of adverse psychological, behav-
ioural, and mental health outcomes have been independently 
associated high trait impulsivity (Grano et al. 2007; Moeller 
et al. 2001; Peluso et al. 2007), low self-regulation (e.g., 
Baumeister 2003; Tangney et al. 2004), and higher self-dis-
gust (Brake et al. 2017; Ille et al. 2014; Overton et al. 2008). 
Our indings suggest that impulsivity, self-regulation, and 
self-disgust may not necessarily be independent predictors 
of such efects. Rather, these variables seem to be associ-
ated with each other in a dynamic way that may explain 
the bivariate associations described in previous research. Of 
course, this process needs to be more thoroughly examined 
in future studies that incorporate measures of mental health 
(e.g., depression) and/or adverse behavioural outcomes, as 
well as longitudinal designs that will allow for more valid 
assessments of temporally-unfolding associations.
Third, although the efect size of the associations between 
self-disgust and emotion regulation strategies were small 
they were statistically signiicant, even after controlling for 
the efects of self-regulation and trait impulsivity. This is 
the irst study to demonstrate the diferential association 
of emotion regulation strategies with self-disgust. In line 
with previous research on the diferential efects of expres-
sive suppression and cognitive reappraisal (e.g., Gross and 
John 2003; Gross and Thompson 2007), the present indings 
showed that cognitive reappraisal was negatively associated 
with self-disgust; thus, suggesting that cognitive reappraisal 
can act protectively against the negative efects of self-dis-
gust on psychological well-being. Of course this needs to 
be determined by future research that will employ speciic 
measures of well-being and psychological functioning. On 
the other hand, expressive suppression was positively asso-
ciated with self-disgust, and this is in accordance with pre-
vious studies which suggested that expressive suppression 
cannot suiciently modify adverse emotional experiences 
(Gross and Thompson 2007). Future studies may further 
extend our indings by assessing whether self-disgust is 
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associated with other aspects of response modulation strat-
egies, such as physiological responding, avoidance, and 
memory impairment (see Gross 2002).
Our study is not free of limitations. First of all, we used a 
cross-sectional design and self-reported measures and this 
limits our ability to draw conclusions about causal associa-
tions and processes. Future studies with prospective designs 
can directly assess the temporal association between trait 
impulsivity, self and emotion regulation, and self-disgust, 
and provide more robust indings concerning the ontogenesis 
of self-disgust experiences. Second, as already mentioned 
we did not measure psychological well-being and mental 
health outcomes. This is a major limitation for the following 
reasons: we cannot establish if the associations we found 
account for variations in mental health and psychological 
outcomes, and we cannot ensure that our indings were not 
confounded by pre-existing mental health conditions, such 
as depression. Given the strong association between self-
disgust with a range of mental health disorders (e.g., Ille 
et al. 2014; Overton et al. 2008), it is recommended that 
future research incorporates relevant measures. Third, self-
reported measures of impulsivity do not always correlate 
with behavioural, lab-based measures (Reynolds et al. 2006). 
Future research should employ a wider range of impulsivity 
measures (e.g., response inhibition tasks; ERPs; fMRI; Moe-
ller et al. 2001) in order to assess the association between 
self-disgust and state measures of impulsivity. Fourth, due to 
the number of parameters estimated in the path models, and 
the increased risk of Type I error, the present results should 
be considered exploratory and warrant replication in further 
conirmatory studies.
Notwithstanding those limitations, however, our study 
was the irst one to demonstrate important associations 
between trait impulsivity, self-regulation, emotion regula-
tion strategies, and self-disgust. Furthermore, using robust 
statistical analyses we demonstrated intervening efects of 
self-regulation and emotion regulation on the association 
between impulsivity and self-disgust. This is an important 
step towards better understanding the psychological phe-
nomena and processes that are related to the deleterious 
experience of self-disgust (Powell et al. 2015).
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